Deforestation is a matter of pressing global concern, yet surprisingly little is known about the relative e¢ cacy of various policies designed to combat it. This paper sets out a framework for measuring the cost e¤ectiveness of alternative policies -both command-and-control and incentive-based -in the Brazilian Amazon. First, I estimate the demand for deforestation on private properties, exploiting regional variation in transportation costs as a means of recovering farmers'responses to permanent policies. By rescaling transportation costs using local yields, I
Introduction
Deforestation is a matter of global concern, not least because of its clear linkage to the pressing issue of climate change. One …fth of greenhouse gas emissions during the 1990s and one tenth during the 2000s have been attributed to deforestation and forest degradation (IPCC (2007 (IPCC ( , 2013 ).
Further, reducing deforestation is viewed as a highly cost-e¤ective means of reducing emissionssee, for example, the Stern Review (2007). Absent global coordination, the most likely arena for implementing policy initiatives to combat deforestation is at the national level. In that context, the Brazilian government has been particularly active, both as home to the largest expanse of intact rainforest on the planet, and because of intense deforestation over the past three decades. 1 The main focus of the federal government has been on quantitative (command-and-control) policies limiting land use on private and public land, and while recent e¤orts to monitor and enforce restrictions applying to new deforestation have yielded some success, the rainforest continues to shrink.
Incentive-based interventions are potentially appealing alternatives to quantitative commandand-control policies. Examples include payment programs, carbon and land use taxes, and emissions trading. 2 In theory, they can achieve any level of protection at the lowest possible cost to society.
While eliminating wasteful expenditures is an important objective by itself and can help avoid political strife, less is known in practice about the magnitudes of these costs, and how they compare to quantitative command-and-control policies. At a general level, the accurate measurement of costs of environmental policies is understood to be a challenging problem, as noted by Pizer and Kopp (2005) . In a deforestation context, a key obstacle is a lack of clear framework based on credible estimation of the process -often decentralized -that leads to deforestation, which can then be used to generate reasonable quantitative policy prescriptions. This paper aims to …ll that gap.
To that end, I develop a uni…ed approach for measuring the cost e¤ectiveness of alternative policies -both command-and-control and incentive-related -in the Brazilian Amazon. The framework is based on a revealed preference approach, uses credible microeconometric estimates, and can be applied to both existing and yet-to-be implemented policies.
A key component of the framework is the demand for deforestation on private properties. This is 1 The accumulated deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon between 1988 and 2017 was approximately 42.8 million hectares, which is an area larger than the state of California (INPE (2017)). 2 Payment programs pay suppliers directly to provide environmental services (Pattanayak, Wunder and Ferraro (2010)). REDD+ is the most prominent example: countries with high emissions can pay to protect forests in developing nations and count the storage of carbon in their overall carbon output. It has been negotiated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since 2005, and it formed part of the Cancun Agreements in December 2010, at COP-16. Environmental taxes are de…ned as taxes levied on the production of negative externalities -the carbon tax is the most well-known example. When the measurement of the externalities is di¢ cult, payments and taxes can be directed to the adoption of particular land uses. de…ned as the function relating the amount of deforested area to the di¤erence between the private value of the agricultural and forested land. 3 It provides farmers'willingness to deforest at di¤erent levels of private costs (a¤ected by potential taxes and payments), as well as the corresponding potential surpluses.
To identify demand, I exploit the fact that regional variation in transportation costs can be used to infer the value of agricultural land relative to forested land. To gain some intuition, consider one farm located close to a major port and another that is far away. Ceteris paribus, as transportation costs increase, both the values of agricultural and forested land should decrease, yet if the value of the agricultural land is disproportionately a¤ected by transportation costs, its relative value should also fall. As a result, one would expect less deforestation in farms located farther away from the port. In this way, variation in transportation costs can be exploited to infer how farmers will respond to changes in private costs. By rescaling the transportation costs using local yields, I am able to value the di¤erence between these two forms of land use in dollars per hectare. The strategy I propose is therefore divided into two steps: …rst, I estimate the e¤ects of transportation costs on deforestation, and second, I rescale these costs using local yields to recover the demand function. 4 My focus is on permanent policies and on permanent e¤ects, as opposed to transitional dynamics. Because deforesting is costly, farmers are more likely to respond to persistent changes in private values than to temporary changes. Policy interventions will thus have substantial impacts on deforestation only if they are put into e¤ect for a long period of time. In this vein, exploiting regional variation in transportation costs is appropriate because persistent changes in private values are likely to be captured by di¤erences in transportation costs in a geographical cross-section. 5 To estimate the model, I combine the Brazilian transportation network of 2006 with the Agricultural Census of 2006, which is the most recent and comprehensive data set available for the agricultural sector in the country. I also supplement the data with detailed spatial information relating to important determinants of land use, such as soil quality, topography, temperature and 3 The vast majority of the deforested areas in the Amazon are used for agriculture, mostly pasture and cropland (see Section 3) . 4 The impacts of transportation costs are estimated using the instrumental variable quantile regression estimator proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) ; an extensive and detailed discussion of the identi…cation strategy is presented in Subsection 4.2. The use of quantile regressions allows for heterogeneous impacts and is discussed in Sections 2 and 4. As a robustness exercise, I also estimated a semiparametric model using the penalized sieve minimum distance estimator proposed by Chen and Pouzo (2012) . The results of the semiparametric model are presented in the Supplemental Material. 5 See Berry (2011) for a discussion of the importance of distinguishing the short-run and the long-run landuse elasticities for biofuels policies, and Scott (2013) for a fully dynamic model of land-use for the US. Important contributions to the literature that develops empirical land use models include Stavins and Jafee (1990) , Stavins (1999) , Pfa¤ (1999) , and Mason and Platinga (2013) , among others. The relationship of the current analysis to the literature is discussed in Section 2. rainfall. The estimates show signi…cant negative impacts of transportation costs on deforestation, as might be expected.
After estimating the model, I investigate the e¤ects of three policy interventions: (a) payments for ecological services (PES); (b) taxes on agricultural land; and (c) quantitative limits on the deforestation allowed on private properties. Large-scale payment programs and land-use taxes
have not yet been adopted in the Brazilian Amazon. Instead, the federal government has relied on quantitative limits. By law, landowners in the Amazon are obligated to keep 80 percent of their properties as native forest (the '80 percent rule'). Yet, there is ample evidence that this rule has not been perfectly enforced: in the data, forest coverage on private properties is approximately 44 percent (see Subsections 3.4 and 5.3). 6 Exploring these policy interventions using my framework yields three main …ndings. First, taxes can be e¤ective in avoiding deforestation. In response to a perfectly-enforced tax of US$ 42.5
per hectare per year on agricultural land, farmers would be willing to maintain 80 percent forest coverage on private properties as opposed to the 44 percent forest coverage observed in the data.
The 36 percent di¤erence corresponds to approximately 27.7 million hectares, which is about 5.5 years of the worldwide net forest loss observed over the past decade. Because farmers'average gross revenue per hectare in 2006 was US$ 120/ha, it should be no surprise that many farmers would not be willing to use land for agriculture with such a tax. 7 In addition, policies that only target small landholders are not able to promote substantial conservation. The extremely unequal distribution of land in the Amazon suggests that payment programs are unlikely to signi…cantly reduce local poverty and deforestation simultaneously.
Second, the existing legislation (in the form of the '80 percent rule') would be expensive for local farmers if it were perfectly enforced, resulting in at least US$ 4.41 billion per year of lost farmer surplus. A tax of US$ 42.5/ha would also result in 80 percent of forest cover, but be substantially less expensive: farmers' lost surplus would be approximately US$ 479 million per year, provided the tax revenues were redistributed to them. 8 This corresponds to a cost saving from the land use tax of approximately 90 percent of the cost of a perfectly enforced '80 percent rule,'which is 6 The establishment of protected areas on public lands is one of the leading forest conservation policies in the world, and in Brazil in particular (Pfa¤, Robalino, Herrera, and Sandoval (2015) ). I do not estimate causal impacts of protected areas on deforestation because my focus is on policies that a¤ect land use in private properties (though I do allow for spillover e¤ects -see discussion in Section 4.2). The type of payment program that I consider are payments to avoid deforestation. Although payments to replant forests are important, they are not studied here. 7 The standard deviation of the gross revenues in 2006 was US$ 560/ha. The high dispersion helps explain why a considerable amount of land might still be farmed under the US$ 42.5/ha tax. Note that instead of a perfectly enforced tax, one may interpret US$ 42.5/ha as the expected tax that farmers would pay. 8 Tax revenues would have been approximately US$ 658 million per year (0.37 percent of the Brazilian federal budget for 2006). substantially higher than the cost saving estimates from allowance trading in pollution markets, ranging from 20 to 47 percent (Schmalensee and Stavins (2017) ). The '80 percent rule'would be substantially more expensive than taxes because the more productive farms would use less land for agriculture and so forgo more pro…ts. Although land-use taxes and payment programs di¤er in several respects (including the distribution of preservation costs, and practical implementation issues), they share the same predictions in terms of land use and lost surpluses in the present context. As such, payments of US$ 42.5/ha would yield the same forest cover as taxes, but would require US$ 2.61 billion per year of transfers to farmers (approximately 1.45 percent of the Brazilian federal budget for 2006). 9 Third, by combining the estimated demand for deforestation with the geographic distribution of the carbon stock in Brazil, I obtain a 'supply of avoided emissions.' If a carbon tax of (or a The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 places the analysis in the context of the related literature. Section 3 provides relevant background to the Brazilian Amazon. Section 4 presents the empirical framework and a detailed discussion of the identi…cation strategy. Section 5 presents the data. The estimated regressions are shown in Section 6. Sections 7 and 8 discuss the estimated demand for deforestation and the policy implications, respectively. Section 9 concludes. 10 
Related Literature
This paper builds on important prior studies that develop empirical land use models and analyze deforestation. The IPCC (2007, 2013 ) and the Stern Review (2007) make extensive use of 9 A perfectly targeted policy making payments only to those who would deforest their lands and not paying those who would not deforest would require less than half of the non-targeted program transfers: US$ 1.18 billion per year. The geographic pattern of deforestation under taxes or payments would also be di¤erent from the pattern under the '80 percent rule' being more concentrated in the South Amazon, which is arguably the most productive area. As a result, forests in the central regions of the rainforest would have been less fragmented, which may be advantageous from a biodiversity point of view.
1 0 The Supplemental Material complements the main text with various robustness exercises and a detailed explanation of the construction of the variables used in the paper.
'engineering/costing'models, in which the values of alternative land uses are calculated from the revenues and costs of the di¤erent alternatives of a representative farm. 11 Although that approach proves fruitful, it does not incorporate unobserved heterogeneity across farms. As a result, all farmers in a region would prefer to not deforest when taxes (or payments) reduce the average value of agricultural land su¢ ciently compared to the average value of forested land. When farms are heterogeneous, however, the marginal unit of land in a region di¤ers from the average unit and so the estimated impacts on deforestation and the estimated costs of policies may be biased.
Revealed-preference methods incorporating unobserved heterogeneity were …rst developed in the seminal contributions of Stavins and Jafee (1990) and Stavins (1999) . Typically, existing studies estimate reduced-form parameters of farmers' land use choice models using short panel data, exploiting variables with a high degree of variation across time, such as prices or revenues;
and di¤erent empirical approaches identify farmers'short-run or long-run responses, depending on the time frame covered in the data. 12 The distinction between farmers' short-run versus long-run responses is important in order to evaluate the performance of alternative policies. As noted already, policy makers may prefer implementing policies that can be put into e¤ect for a long period of time. Estimates obtained from short panel data, however, exploiting, say, year-to-year variation in prices may not provide a reliable indication as to how farmers would react to a counterfactual permanent policy change. In other words, counterfactual simulations may su¤er from an external validity problem.
One possible solution is to estimate a forward-looking dynamic structural model of land use choice. In a recent innovative contribution, Scott (2013) implements a structural model in a US setting and …nds that dynamic reduced-form models (i.e., with myopic agents) likely understate long-run land use responses. Structural dynamic models require access to rich data that are not always available, especially in developing countries, where most of the worldwide deforestation has been occurring (FAO (2016)). When access to data is somewhat limited, another approach is necessary (Timmins and Schlenker (2009), Brady and Irwin (2011) ).
In this paper, I exploit regional variation in transportation costs as a means to recover farmers' responses to permanent policies. The …rst step of my strategy builds on a growing literature that estimates the determinants of land use. 13 The typical exercise in that literature involves regressing deforestation on covariates using ordinary least squares (OLS), ‡exible methods such as matching, or …xed-e¤ect methods using panel data. A common focus has been on the impacts of roads on deforestation; existing studies do not attempt to estimate how farmers would respond to counterfactual incentive-based policies.
Compared to that literature, the …rst part of my strategy adds a plausible instrumental variables approach to address the potential endogeneity of roads and measurement errors in transportation costs, in a similar spirit to Chomitz and Gray (1996) (see Subsection 4.2 for a detailed discussion of the identi…cation strategy). In addition, I allow for heterogeneous impacts across municipalities through the use of quantile regressions. Conditional on observables, a highly deforested location may be well-suited to agriculture in terms of unobservables so that transportation costs would have to increase considerably to reduce the amount of agricultural land; better preserved locations, in contrast, may be more sensitive to changes in transportation costs. An implication is that the relative value of the agricultural land also likely di¤ers at the upper and lower tails of the conditional distribution of deforestation. These di¤erences may lead to non-trivial impacts on the aggregate costs of the policy interventions. My results (shown in details in Sections 6 and 7) con…rm this: the estimated coe¢ cients di¤er across quantiles, and have important impacts on the total costs of policies. 14 A related recent literature focuses on the impacts of roads on deforestation and on local economies using treatment e¤ects methods. Those studies construct treatment and control groups carefully based on regions (say, census tracts) that received road investments versus regions that did not. Examples include Banerjee, Du ‡o and Qian (2012) for impacts on local GDP in China, and Pfa¤ and Robalino (2013) for impacts on deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Although those approaches are appealing, they are not well-suited for my purposes here. First, the estimated di¤erences in land use between places close to and distant from local roads can explain the di¤ erential impacts on the groups, but I need to estimate the overall impacts of roads on land use to back out farmers'private values. In addition, they do not take into account improvements in roads elsewhere in the transportation network (except by use of adjacency matrices). I instead consider roads as a network and estimate aggregate impacts of transportation networks in a spirit similar Brady and Irwin (2011) , and the literature cited therein. 1 4 Speci…cally, the standard two stages least squares estimator (2SLS) cannot capture heterogeneous responses to changes in private values, and overestimates the total costs of policies. According to the 2SLS estimates, a land-use tax that gives rise to 80 percent of forest cover would cost approximately US$ 786 million per year, which is 64 percent more than the estimated costs based on the quantile approach.
to Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) .
Finally, a growing literature studies recently-implemented 'payment for ecological services'programs. Those studies use treatment e¤ect techniques and …nd mixed results. Possible explanations include program design, and the fact that evaluations have taken place in countries -mainly Mexico and Costa Rica -in which deforestation rates were declining over the period of the program (Alix-Garcia and Wol¤ (2014)). The current paper complements that literature by providing a framework for estimating the potential e¤ects of policies yet to be implemented. 15 3 Background to the Brazilian Amazon Simonet et al. (2015) provides the …rst impact analysis of a small-scale PES pilot project in the Brazilian Amazon. They …nd the program has decreased the deforestation rate by about 50 percent, with no evidence of leakage e¤ects, and that the monetary gains from the avoided carbon emissions largely exceeds the implementation costs. 1 Roraima. The Legal Amazon is an administrative area in the northern part of Brazil that includes the nine states indicated in Figure 1 . 1 9 The unprotected public land can still be occupied and claimed by squatters. Despite this fact, most farmers have land titles (85 percent), and the proportion of farms with no land titles is higher among small landholders (20 percent). Small landholders in the present paper are those who own farms less than 5 hectares in size.
2 0 The production of soybeans and corn is located mostly in the South Amazon and is directed to international markets. Manioc, rice and beans are consumed domestically, with manioc being more concentrated in pristine areas, possibly for subsistence. The logging industry is located along the South and Eastern Amazon and it directed 36 percent of its production to international markets in 2009 (data sources: USDA (www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/), and the Brazilian Agricultural Census for 2006). 2 1 Based on remote-sensing data for 2008, Almeida et al. (2016) estimate that approximately 90 percent of the total deforested area in the Brazilian Amazon is used for agriculture (pasture and cropland), 3 percent corresponds to mining, urban areas, and others, and the remaining 7 percent is unobserved (i.e., areas whose land cover cannot be interpreted due to cloud shade or smoke from recently burned areas). 
Transportation Network

Legislation and Penalties
If a farmer wants to clear a fraction of his land, he needs to hold many licenses and authorizations, including a detailed plan of management that must be approved by the state and the national environmental protection agencies. The requirements are costly and time-consuming to ful…l, and may take several months to be approved (Hirakuri (2003) ). Sanctions for forest-related violations include …nes ranging from US$ 2,300 to US$ 23,000 per hectare, the seizure of products and equipment, and the suspension of activities. The …nes are extremely costly to farmers in view of their average gross revenue per hectare, which was US$ 120/ha according to the Agricultural
Census of 2006.
There is evidence that the legislation has not been fully enforced. 23 
Model and Estimation
In this section, I present a stylized model to guide the empirical analysis. Before setting out the details of the model, several remarks about the general formulation are in order. First, deforestation will be thought of as the share of agricultural land on private properties. I assume the land was originally forested, so that clearing it for agriculture is equivalent to deforesting it. The remaining area includes managed forest (which can be used to produce timber or other forest products) and forest that is not being exploited. 24 Second, the available data are already aggregated up to the municipal level. Thus, it is not possible to distinguish between a model in which farmers choose the share of agricultural land and a model in which there is a continuum of farmers making binary choices between agricultural and forest land. The typical exercise in the literature that estimates the impact of roads on deforestation assumes a binary choice model for individual landowners' decisions and aggregates their choices up to the municipality level (Pfa¤ (1999) ). I follow that literature in order to make my procedure comparable to existing research and because the binary choice model is convenient when interpreting the results. 25 Third, the policies I consider seek to in ‡uence the way farmers use their land. For this reason, I focus on landowners'choices within private properties. It makes little sense to tax (or pay for) land that no one owns; and the '80 percent rule'does not apply to public land. Deforestation of public land is an important problem in the Amazon, but one that I do not investigate here. I also split the sample into di¤erent farm sizes and conduct the analysis separately for each sub-group. result of redoubled government e¤orts to slow down deforestation (see Assunção, Gandour and Rocha (2013)). 2 3 This is based on informal conversations with IBAMA sta¤. IBAMA does not have the o¢ cial numbers yet because the state agencies responsible to supply the information to the national system do not provide data on regularized deforested areas. 2 4 Although most of the deforestation took place in the past, transportation costs decreased over time as the transportation network evolved. The incentives to deforest in response to these cost reductions has therefore increased over the years. 2 5 The aggregated nature of the data prevents me from considering local neighbor interactions. See Robalino and Pfa¤ (2012) for an analysis of the importance of neighbor interactions based on detailed micro data for Costa Rica.
Separating the groups allows for diminishing (or increasing) returns to agricultural land that may a¤ect farmers' private valuations. It may also be informative for policy makers: to the extent that policy makers view payment programs as a way to reduce poverty, they may want to adjust payments to small landholders. 26 Finally, from a policy perspective, although land-use taxes and payment programs di¤er in several respects (including practical implementation issues and the distribution of preservation costs), they share the same predictions for land use decisions in the present context, as will be clear below. For this reason, I lump them into one policy and refer to them simply as "taxes," unless stated otherwise.
Next, I present the details of the model, and describe the identi…cation strategy.
Model
Take a parcel of land i that belongs to a farm of size s located in municipality m. Assume there is a continuum of such parcels, and for each parcel, the farmer decides whether or not to clear it for agriculture. Let P ims be a vector of input and output farmgate prices and X ims be a vector of other determinants of land use (e.g., productivity factors). De…ne a (P ims ; X ims ) as the expected discounted present value of current and future pro…ts obtained by using the parcel for agriculture, and let f (P ims ; X ims ) be the corresponding value obtained from leaving the plot as managed forest. The agricultural value a incorporates upfront conversion costs and expected penalties for illegal deforestation (when applicable). The forest value f includes pro…ts from forest products (e.g., wild fruits and timber), the option value to deforest in the future, as well as possible nonpecuniary bene…ts. Let Y ims equal one if the plot i is cleared and zero otherwise. Then,
where 1 f.g is the indicator function. 27 2 6 A¤ecting land use decisions on private land is an important way to promote conservation, considering that private properties occupy about 18 percent of the Amazon. More importantly, deforestation has been more intense in the states of the South Amazon (the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso, see Section 3) where private properties occupy about 45 percent of the total area. 2 7 One may interpret a and f as choice-speci…c value functions of a fully dynamic model. A structural dynamic model would separately identify and estimate the di¤erent components of a and f (current payo¤, conversion costs, continuation values, and so on); see, e.g. Scott (2013) . Because I do not estimate a structural dynamic model, the estimated parameters of the choice-speci…c values are not invariant to certain policy changes. While the framework allows me to estimate the e¤ects of permanent changes in these values, it cannot estimate, for instance, the impact of a change in the volatility of timber prices, as this a¤ects continuation values (in particular, the option value to deforest) in a way that the "reduced-form" payo¤ function cannot capture in the cross-sectional data. I am grateful to the Editor and an anonymous referee for pointing that out.
The vector of determinants of land use can be decomposed as X ims = (X m ; U m (s) ; " x ims ), where X m is a municipality-level vector of observed productivity shifters, such as soil quality and other agroclimatic conditions, as well as government monitoring e¤orts to deter illegal deforestation; U m (s) is a municipality-level unobserved productivity shock; and " x ims captures farmers'unobserved idiosyncratic abilities, e¤ort and the deviations from both X m and U m (s) within m. Because the empirical analysis is conducted separately for each farm size, it is possible to allow the unobservable U m (s) to be indexed by the size of the farm, which allows for a richer model than the usual municipality random e¤ects model. That is, a municipality may be suitable for agriculture for large farms but less good for small landholders.
I assume farmers are price takers, that all production is sold in nearby markets or exported directly, and that a no-arbitrage condition holds. These assumptions imply that local prices are determined by the international price minus the transportation cost to the nearest port, i.e., P ims = P T C ims . The transportation cost T C ims can in turn be decomposed into two parts. The cost to transport a product from the municipal seat to the nearest port is denoted by T C m ; a proxy for this variable is observed in the data. The deviation of the farm's transportation cost to T C m is denoted by " t ims , and is unobserved by the econometrician but observed by the farmer. 28 Although the costs to transport di¤erent products may not be equal, they are likely to be proportional: all products use the same transportation network and reach the same ports (under the no-arbitrage condition). Therefore, the transportation costs of di¤erent products should be highly collinear, which makes it di¢ cult to separately identify their impacts on deforestation. I therefore proceed with a single measure for transportation costs to re ‡ect di¤erences in local prices.
The exact proxy for T C m is explained in Section 5. 29 The existing literature typically projects the di¤erence between a and f on the municipallevel variables (T C m; X m ; U m (s)) and collapses all individual heterogeneity into a single scalar, " ims . In the present case, the model reduces to
where the coe¢ cients can be di¤erent for di¤erent farm sizes. In addition, an extreme value distribution for " ims is typically imposed. 30 Let Y m (s) be the aggregated share of agricultural land within farms of size s in municipality m. The resulting logit model can be estimated after taking the di¤erences of log shares as:
Note that farm size, s, is not an explanatory variable in equation (1): I do not attempt to explain deforestation by exogenously varying the size of the farms. Although the endogeneity of farm sizes has been discussed extensively in the literature, particularly in the literature that estimates impacts of cultivated agricultural area on rural productivity (see, e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig (2011) and the references cited therein), there is no problem of endogeneity of farm sizes when estimating equation (1) . 31 The typical exercise in the literature estimates equation (1) Second, I use quantile regression instead of mean regression. As noted previously, two observationally equivalent locations (in term of X and T C) may respond di¤erently to changes in transportations costs. On the one hand, a highly deforested location may be well-suited to agriculture in terms of unobservables so that increases in transportation costs may not signi…cantly reduce the cultivated area. On the other hand, a preserved location may be so unsuitable for agriculture that small increases in T C could substantially reduce deforestation. The impacts of roads therefore likely di¤er at the upper and lower tails of the conditional distribution of deforestation.
An implication of this is that the relative value of the agricultural land also likely di¤ers at the upper and lower tails of the conditional distribution: some locations may be more sensitive to taxes than others and so may face higher costs (lost surpluses) when taxes are imposed. In turn, these di¤erences may lead to non-trivial impacts on the aggregated costs of policy interventions.
3 0 Given the linear speci…cation, the international prices P are incorporated into the constant term, and the idiosyncratic shocks "ims are composed of " x ims s" t ims . The variance of "ims may di¤er for di¤erent farm sizes s, which in turn may a¤ect the scale of the estimated model parameters. This is a common aspect of discrete choice models. 3 1 To identify impacts of farm size on the pro…tability of farms in India, Foster and Rosenzweig (2011) make use of the fact that a substantial fraction of the households in their data divided (or received inherited) land because a parent died. This source of exogenous variation together with the panel data structure are exploited to handle the endogeneity of farm sizes. I have no such exogenous variation in the current data set.
To allow transportation costs to a¤ect the entire conditional distribution of deforestation, I use a quantile model. Instead of estimating equation (1), I estimate:
where U m (s) is now normalized to have a uniform distribution on [0; 1]. Equation (2) so that a location more prone to agricultural activities is associated with a higher value of u. The coe¢ cients on X and T C can depend arbitrarily on both the farm size s and the quantile u, which implies heterogenous e¤ects on deforestation. This ‡exibility relaxes the role of both the singleindex restriction and the logit assumption in determining the shape of the demand for deforestation.
From now on, I change notation slightly and denote the coe¢ cients by ( su ; su ).
Because the transportation cost is not exogenous, the conventional quantile regression estimator is inconsistent for estimating the QTR function. For this reason, I estimate equation (2) Demand for Deforestation. Taking the logistic function h (x) = exp(x)=(1 + exp(x)), the share of agricultural land for farms of size s in municipality m at a given quantile u is given by h (X m su su T C m ). The e¤ect of raising the private value of the forested area (relative to the value of agricultural area) by US$ t per hectare on farmers'land-use decisions is given by
where Y m (s; t) is the counterfactual share of agricultural land, and q m (s) is the quantity (in tons)
of agricultural output sold per hectare. I de…ne the demand for deforestation for farms of size s in municipality m as the product of the total area they occupy and the counterfactual share Y m (s; t).
The total demand aggregates over s and m. 32 3 2 This structure can be extended to consider multinomial choice models (e.g., forest vs. crop vs. cattle ranching), and in principle, variables other than T Cm can be used to capture variation in private values (e.g., data on agricultural potential to identify crops vs. livestock). Yet, in order to be useful, any such variable must satisfy three requirements: (a) it must a¤ect farmers'decisions signi…cantly, i.e., it must have a coe¢ cient that is di¤erent from zero; (b) it must be measured in dollars in a way that can be converted into the appropriate units; and (c) it must be able to capture persistent di¤erences in the private returns to land use. None of the variables in Xm in the present data set satis…es all three requirements.
Two aspects of the demand function require discussion. First, following Chernozhukov and Hansen's (2013) terminology again, this demand satis…es the "rank invariance" assumption. Rank invariance is a common assumption in the applied literature and preserves the intuitive notion that, conditional on observables, a relatively highly deforested location in the data (i.e., a location associated with a high rank u) remains a relatively highly deforested location under alternative counterfactual policies (i.e., it preserves the rank u). 33 Second, because the data are aggregated up to the municipality level, and because there are hundreds of products being produced in the Amazon, some care is needed in de…ning q m (s). I selected the most representative products (those discussed in the Subsection 3.2) and constructed a local productivity index (in which the weights are the proportions of the area utilized for each product). The underlying assumption here is that once the land is cleared for agriculture, it is used in …xed proportions for pasture and for the main crops: the proportions are allowed to di¤er across municipalities, but they are …xed within the municipality. 34 
Identi…cation Strategy
Endogeneity. There are several reasons why one needs to instrument for transportation costs in land-use regressions. First, they are likely measured with an error. The proxy for transportation costs is de…ned here as the minimum unit cost (US$/ton) to transport 1 ton of goods to the nearest port using the most cost-e¤ective route. It is a common proxy used in the literature (Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) ), but it may not provide an accurate measure of the real costs that farmers incur and so is potentially mismeasured. If the measurement error is classical, it may induce an attenuation bias in the OLS estimates.
Second, previously deforested regions may have a higher demand for improvements in local infrastructure conditions, including more and better roads, which leads to reverse causality in crosssectional data. Third, roads may have been built in response to pro…table agricultural conditions. As a common example, unobservable (to the econometrician) soil quality for agriculture in a given 3 3 Empirical applications that estimate QTR functions under the rank invariance assumption include Hausman and Sidak (2004), Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) , and Lamarche (2011). 3 4 I also consider a second index that includes only the main crops and ignores pasture land. This severely restricts the substitution patterns among land uses within municipalities and so provides a conservative upper bound on the demand for deforestation. More general substitution patterns could be recovered by exploiting choice-speci…c variables that shift the value of each type of land use independently of the value of the other options (Berry and Haile (2014)), but there is no variable satisfying such a requirement in the present data set. I therefore choose to be agnostic in terms of the way the agricultural area is divided when estimating the impacts of T Cm on deforestation, and reported the results for both indices. I also examined whether the indices qm respond to T Cm, and found no such evidence: farmers seem to adjust the extensive margin (land use), but not the intensive margin (yields), which is consistent with Roberts and Schlenker (2013) . (See the Supplemental Material.) location may have induced both deforestation and road construction to access the location. Both the simultaneity and the omitted variable problems may lead the OLS estimates to overstate the impact of transportation costs.
In the present case, the omitted variable problem does not necessarily lead to an upward bias. Instruments. I use straight-line distances to the nearest port and to the nearest state capital as instruments for transportation costs. I now discuss (a) why one should expect straight-line distances to be strong instruments -this is testable, and (b) under what conditions one should expect the instruments to satisfy an exclusion restriction condition.
As mentioned in
First, it is evident that distances to the nearest port should correlate with the costs to the ports.
Furthermore, to the extent that state capitals are connected to better transportation infrastructure (see Subsection 3.3), a location close to a state capital should have lower costs (ceteris paribus) of reaching the ports. Therefore, the distance to the nearest capital should also be positively correlated with transportation costs.
The conditions under which the instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction are more involved.
I start following the discussion presented by Chomitz and Gray (1996) . Because locations of major towns -in the present case, ports and state capitals -were determined by geography and historical reasons long before the expansion of the roads in the 1970s, I can construct an exogenous network of roads by linking the major centers with straight-lines. 35 The distances computed using the virtual network should be correlated with transportation costs to ports, because the location of the towns creates links between the major centers, but not the precise routing. Similar to the ports and state capitals, most of the municipal seats in the Amazon were established long before the occupation of the Amazon. Speci…cally, they were established by the late 1800s and early 1900s and -as discussed earlier -were not necessarily located in areas where agricultural activity was more valuable. It is conceivable therefore that the virtual road network is exogenous to the agricultural activities that took place in the Amazon after the 1970s. Given that using the virtual network and computing straight-line distances directly to the main destinations provides the same information, I opted for the simpler solution.
Although the virtual road network can be viewed as exogenous to recent agricultural activities, it is still possible that the straight-line distances correlate with factors that a¤ect farmers'decisions to deforest. It is therefore necessary to control for those factors. As discussed in Subsection 4.1, farmers' decisions depend on productivity shifters, government monitoring e¤orts, and on farmgate input and output prices. Once those factors are taken into account, straight-line distances do not in ‡uence farmers'choices. In the application, I control for di¤erences in productivity using measurements of soil quality and various agroclimatic variables. I consider two proxies for monitoring e¤orts (which I discuss in more detail below): the number of …nes issued for environmental infractions, and the distance to the nearest IBAMA o¢ ce (the Brazilian Environmental Protection Agency). Variation in local prices is explained by variation in transportation costs to the nearest port, at least for tradable goods.
The instruments may be invalid if there are inputs or outputs whose prices are not …xed in the international market. In such a case, local market conditions may a¤ect local prices and correlate with straight-line distances to the main destinations. Consider local labor markets: wages may have to increase as the municipalities are found further away from the nearest capital, all else equal, to compensate workers for working away from more desired locations. Municipalities further away from the capital may deforest less than a location close to the capital because of wage di¤erences.
If the wage di¤erences are not controlled for in the regression, and correlate with the instruments, then the proposed instruments are invalid. A similar problem may occur if there are other nontradable inputs and outputs.
To mitigate this problem, I include in the regressions factors that shift local demand and supply for non-tradable inputs and outputs that may correlate with straight-line distances. Speci…cally, I
include the local population, the presence of power plants (mainly hydroelectric facilities), and local mining. While the local population shifts the supply of labor and increases the demand for nontradables, power plants and mining shift both the demand for labor and non-tradables. Although one may be concerned with the endogeneity of population, including and excluding population in the regressions does not change the results signi…cantly. I present the estimates in the Supplemental Material.
In addition, inter-related local markets may create spatial dependence in terms of farmers' decisions across municipalities. For instance, Assunção, Lipscomb, Mobarak and Szerman (2016) provide evidence that power plants a¤ect land use decisions in the neighborhood of power plants in Brazil. To take this dependence into account, I also include spatially lagged regressors of the local demand and supply shifters among the covariates. 36 To capture government monitoring e¤orts, I consider the distance to the nearest IBAMA o¢ ce and the number of …nes issued. Distance to IBAMA is intended to capture the possibility that monitoring and punishing farmers for illegal deforestation is more di¢ cult for farms located in more pristine areas, i.e., the farther away the farm is, the less monitoring there will be, and so the more incentive the farmer will have to deforest. Ignoring this possibility may lead to the underestimates of the impacts of transportation costs. This causes an upward bias in the estimated coe¢ cient on …nes. The biases on the coe¢ cients on T C m caused by this simultaneity problem are less clear ex-ante; and it is a nontrivial task to …nd good instruments for environmental infractions in a cross-section of Amazonian municipalities.
Against that, ignoring the number of …nes in the regressions may lead to omitted variables bias.
The direction of the omitted variables bias depends on the correlation between …nes and the instruments for T C m . In the data, this correlation is small, which suggests the omission may result in small biases. Indeed, the estimated coe¢ cients on …nes have the expected sign, but they are not statistically signi…cant, their magnitudes are small, and the coe¢ cients on costs to port are not substantially a¤ected by the inclusion or the exclusion of …nes (see Supplemental Material). This is consistent with the interpretation that the increased monitoring e¤orts were too recent to a¤ect the total accumulated deforested land by 2006 substantially.
There are two more factors that potentially a¤ect farmers'decisions to deforest and that may correlate with distances to ports and to state capitals: the proximity to protected areas (PAs), and the potential lack of property rights. Protected areas may have spillover e¤ects that in ‡uence the value of nearby forestlands. Robalino, Pfa¤, and Villalobos-Fiatt (2017) present evidence for Costa Rica showing that PAs may indeed cause deforestation in surrounding areas. To allow for this potential mechanism, I include the distance to the closest PA as well as its spatially lagged value in the land-use regressions.
The potential lack of property rights is another possible determinant of land use. Historically, farmers had incentives to deforest as a way to secure their land tenure (Andersen et al. (2002)) . It is conceivable then that the further farms are from a state capital, the less secure the land rights are, and so the more incentive farmers have to deforest -that is, the greater the distance, the larger the deforested area. To address this issue, I include a proxy for property rights in the regressions.
In the Brazilian Agricultural Census, the best proxy for property rights is the proportion of private land with a land title -presumably, the higher the tenure security, the larger is the proportion of land with land titles. 37 
Data
In this section, I explain brie ‡y how deforestation and transportation costs are measured. Then I present relevant summary statistics. The set of covariates that I use in the regressions includes: soil quality, temperature, rainfall, altitude, slope, local population, local mining, local power plants, 
Dependent Variable: Deforestation
The land use classi…cation in the Brazilian Agricultural Census of 2006 is divided into several categories that I aggregated up to two: agricultural and forested land. 38 Agricultural land includes pasture and crops, while forested land aggregates managed forests and forests that are not currently being exploited. The categories of farm size considered here are: (a) small farms (those with fewer than 5 hectares); (b) small-to-medium farms (those with an area between 5 and 50 hectares); (c) medium-to-large farms (those with an area between 50 and 500 hectares); and (d) large farms (those consisting of more than 500 hectares).
Endogenous Regressor: Transportation Costs
As a proxy for transportation costs, I use the minimum unit cost (US$/ton) to transport 1 ton of goods to the nearest port. This cost is calculated by combining information from the Brazil- 
Summary Statistics
There are 523 municipalities in the data set. Table 1 averages across municipalities. The concentration of land is clear from the table: despite the fact that large farms are a small proportion of the total number of farms (5 percent), they occupy about 50 percent of the private farmland, while small farms account for 21 percent of the farms and occupy only 1 percent of the private land. The small landholders tend to deforest a large part of their land (90 percent), but the proportion of deforestation diminishes as farm size increases. Recall that the existing legislation requires the deforestation to be less than 20 percent of the property. 
E¤ects of Transportation Cost on Deforestation
This section presents the estimated impact of transportation costs on deforestation. I …rst check for the presence of weak instruments, then I turn to the land-use regressions. I leave the results of the semiparametric quantile IV model for the Supplemental Material because there are no signi…cant di¤erences between the logit and the semiparametric models. This fact suggests that the quantile logit model is su¢ ciently ‡exible for the current data set. Table 3 presents the results from regressing transportation costs to the nearest port on straight-line distances. For brevity, the estimated coe¢ cients on the other covariates are omitted. It is clear that both straight-line distances to ports and to the nearest capital are strong predictors of costs to ports and that there is no issue with weak instruments in this data set. Increasing the distance to the nearest port by 100 km raises the cost to transport 1 ton of soybeans by US$ 4 on average (which corresponds to 10 percent of the average transportation cost -see Table 1 ). 0.92 t-statistics in parentheses, *** p < 0.001.
First Stage Regression
Land Use Regressions
Next, I present results for the logit models. Table 4 reports the estimated coe¢ cients for costs to the nearest port and the associated t-statistics in parentheses for the OLS, 2SLS, quantile regression (QR), and the instrumental variable quantile regression (IVQR) for each farm size. The coe¢ cients on the other regressors are omitted in the table, but they are reported in the Supplemental Material, where I discuss several robustness exercises. 39 I begin by comparing the OLS and the 2SLS estimates. Recall that the typical exercise in the literature uses OLS to estimate the land-use regressions. As discussed in Subsection 4.2, it is not clear ex-ante what the direction and magnitude of any bias from the OLS estimates would be. The OLS coe¢ cients in Table 4 are small in magnitude and are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
In addition, they predict positive impacts of costs to ports on the share of agricultural land for small and medium-sized farms. When transportation costs are instrumented for using straight-line distances, the coe¢ cients increase in magnitude (except for smallholders) and their signs become negative for all farm sizes. Similarly to OLS estimates, however, the 2SLS coe¢ cients are also imprecisely estimated.
Next I focus on the quantile regressions. The IVQR coe¢ cients for medium-sized and large farms are negative, and almost all are signi…cant and greater in absolute value than the QR coe¢ cients.
The coe¢ cients di¤er across quantiles, so even after controlling for observable municipality-level variables, farms with di¤erent levels of deforestation appear to respond di¤erently to changes in transportation costs.
The heterogeneity in responses across quantiles can be illustrated graphically. estimated coe¢ cients on transportation costs based on the OLS, 2SLS, QR, and IVQR estimators. For each farm size, the dependent variable is the log odds ratio of the share of deforestation. The unit of observation is a municipality in the Amazon. The number of observations for small farms is 501, for small-medium farms is 520, for medium-large farms is 520, and for large farms is 450. t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. for all but the lowest decile. This seems reasonable because small farms tend to be concentrated in isolated regions in the Western Amazon and produce manioc, which is consumed domestically and does not require a signi…cant amount of inputs. They are most likely producing for subsistence and are not engaged in the market. As such, their decision to deforest must be driven by the shadow value of food, and not by the costs to the nearest port. Even though they likely respond to payment programs or to land use taxes, the econometric model does not seem to be well-suited for them and so my strategy most likely fails to identify their demand for deforestation. Despite these problems, the behavior of small landholders does not play a major role in environmental policies given that they occupy only 1 percent of the private land.
For other farm sizes, the upper-tail quantile curves tend to be concave, while the lower-tail quantile curves tend to be convex, which conforms to the discussion in Subsection 4.1. These results reveal that the mean e¤ects estimates based on 2SLS mask considerable heterogeneity. The heterogeneity in responses, according to the IVQR estimates, can vary substantially across (a) farm sizes s, (b) quantiles u (for any given s and T C), and (c) transportation costs (for any s and u). 40 Table 4 , holding covariates at the sample mean. It also shows the estimated marginal e¤ects of transportation costs on the share of deforestation based on the IVQR model. Marginal e¤ects are measured in percentage points and correspond to an increase of $10 per ton in transportation costs.
To have a sense of the magnitudes involved, Table 5 presents the estimated marginal e¤ects of transportation costs on the share of deforestation for each farm size and for di¤erent quantiles based on the IVQR model. The marginal e¤ects are measured in percentage points and correspond to an increase in transportation costs of $10/ton, which is approximately one third of a standard deviation in the data -see Table 1 . The covariates are …xed at the sample average. Consistent with Figure 3 , the marginal e¤ects tend to be greater at lower quantiles and for larger farms. Taking the (conditional) median, note that, while increasing transportation costs by $10/ton increases the estimated fraction of deforestation on small farms by only 0.24 percentage point, it reduces the corresponding fraction of deforestation on medium-sized farms by 1-1.5 percentage points, and on large farms by 2.5 percentage points.
Demand for Deforestation
In this section, I present and discuss the estimated demand for deforestation on private properties. was US$ 120/ha, such a tax would drive many farmers out of production. 43 It is clear from Figure 4 that the shape of the total demand mainly comes from the demand of large farms. The extremely unequal distribution of land in the Amazon coupled with the response of large farms to taxes suggest that policies targeting only small landholders cannot promote signi…cant 4 1 In practice, I impose the rank invariance condition in the following way: for each farm size s and each municipality m, I compute the estimated QTR function X 0 m s (u) s (u) T Cm for all quantiles. I then rearrange the quantiles according to the procedure proposed by Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, and Galichon (2010) to avoid quantile crossing. The rank u associated with observation (s; m) is the one that minimizes the di¤erence between the observed log (Ym (s) = (1 Ym (s))) and the estimated QTR function. I hold the rank …xed when calculating the demand for deforestation. 4 2 An implicit assumption in this calculation is that taxes would not change the distribution of farm sizes. Although taxes could a¤ect the sizes of farms, such impacts are beyond the scope of the paper (see a discussion of this point in Subsection 8.3). 4 3 One may interpret the results in terms of expected taxes that farmers would pay instead of a perfectly enforced tax. 
Geographic Distribution
In Figure The …gure makes clear that farmers in the 'Arc of Deforestation'respond less to taxes. Even under a tax of US$ 100/ha, farmers in the South Amazon, the region where the soybean is produced, would be willing to use their land intensively. The opportunity costs of the agricultural area in this region are probably too high to not be used for agriculture. In contrast, forests in the central and western regions can be preserved more under taxes and so be less fragmented, which is advantageous from a biodiversity point of view.
[FIGURE 5 HERE]
Monitoring E¤orts Post-2004
As 
Policy Analysis
In this section, I apply the framework to examine important policy questions. First, I consider the implications for carbon emissions and for the optimal tax. I then examine the resulting economic costs for the three policy interventions (taxes, payments and the '80 percent rule'). I close the section with a discussion of the limitations of the analysis. farmers would be willing to keep almost all the total private land forested. 45 The shape of the supply curve I estimate is similar to other studies; see, e.g., Nepstad et al. 46 The di¤erence between the potential carbon tax and the market price of carbon suggests substantial opportunities for trade, but such oppor- 4 5 The calculation assumes that (a) the di¤erence in the carbon stock comparing forested and deforested areas would be released into the atmosphere once the forest was removed (i.e., it ignores the decay rate); and (b) the carbon taxes would not a¤ect the amount of carbon stock in agricultural land, although, in principle, farmers could respond to carbon taxes by using new techniques that conserve more carbon on the ground. To better understand the calculation, note that for a parcel in which the carbon di¤erence between forested and deforested land is 80 tC, a land-use tax of $10/ha is equivalent to a carbon tax of $0.125/tC (and to $0.034/tCO2, because 1tC = 44/12 tCO2). 4 6 The calculation converts dollars to 2006 using US Consumer Price Index data. 
Emissions of CO
The Costs of the Policy Interventions
Brazil adopted a command-and-control policy approach that obligates farmers in the Amazon to and so would have foregone more pro…ts, compared to taxes. Although in theory command-andcontrol approaches could also be cost-e¤ective, they would require policy makers to obtain detailed information about each farmer's opportunity costs of land use, and set di¤erent limits on land use for each farm. Such information is not readily available to policy makers (Stavins (2000) ). 48 To cover other possible policy responses, I now brie ‡y discuss payment programs. Similar As noted previously, the 2SLS estimator cannot capture heterogeneous responses to changes in private values, and this may a¤ect the estimated costs of policy interventions. Indeed, the 2SLS parameter estimates presented in Table 4 are relatively small in magnitude and fail to capture the high sensitivity of deforestation to changes in transportation costs at some quantiles. As a costs of agricultural land, while the local land-use taxes I used to approximate the '80 percent rule' are (locally) a cost-e¤ective price instrument; (b) the legislation does not allow for managed forests in preservation areas, except under very stringent conditions, but the forested area in the data potentially includes managed forests; and (c) the costs to replant the vegetation add to the farmers'total costs since, by law, they must restore the forest at their own expense.
consequence, the land-use tax that results in there being 80 percent forest cover and that is based on the 2SLS estimates would be substantially higher: US$ 65/ha. The corresponding economic cost would be approximately US$ 786 million, which is 64 percent higher than the estimated cost based on the quantile approach. The greater lost surplus from the 2SLS estimator points to the importance of allowing for heterogeneity in the demand for deforestation.
Limitations
The above analysis has some limitations that I discuss next. A second limitation is that indirect e¤ects are not considered here. 51 For instance, I have not estimated by how much the total private land (and the land distribution) would respond to the policies. Although such an exercise is possible, there are important implications that cannot be addressed with the present data set. For example, the '80 percent rule,'if perfectly enforced, may provide incentives to have large farms. Also, plenty of unprotected public forested land might be occupied in response to payment programs. Such occupations might reduce the potential e¤ec-tiveness of the programs, increase their total costs, and increase disputes over land along with the potential violence associated with these disputes. The results I present should thus be viewed as one of the inputs necessary for a complete evaluation of conservation policies.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have set out a uni…ed econometric framework to estimate the impacts and cost e¤ectiveness of alternative conservation policies. Applied to the Brazilian Amazon, the main pol-5 0 INPE is responsible for the detection of 'hot spots' using satellite data and for providing the information to IBAMA. IBAMA then sends their inspectors to those hot spots, issues the appropriate …nes, and follows up with the administrative and judicial processes. command-and-control policies that limit deforestation allowed on private properties are considerably more costly than incentive-based policies.
There are several directions for future research. First, accessing micro-data on farmers'decisions is likely to provide a fuller picture of their opportunity costs and avoid the potential drawbacks of using aggregated measures for local yields. Furthermore, micro-data may reveal the entire distribution of farmer's private valuations within each municipality, which may help address issues such as the use of auctions to allocate PES contracts. Second, a panel data set based on satellite images would allow a dynamic model of land use decisions to be estimated. Such a model could be used to study impacts of commodity prices on the rate of deforestation and how much these prices could a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent policy interventions. Third, the framework presented here can be used to study impacts of improvements of roads on deforestation. This is an important topic, looking ahead, because the Brazilian government is paving some unpaved roads in the Amazon to reduce the costs of exporting commodities. 
